Incessant struggle exists between the unyielding march of time, which brings with it entropy and increasing horizontality — against the forces of order, centralisation and organisation.
Buildings crumble, eroded by the sands of time, yet still man builds.
Through the course of history we have seen the erosion of top-down systems of command, planned economies, despots — in favour of fluctuable exchange, organic networks and rhizomatic propagation.
Paradoxically, the geopolitical trend seems to favour the consolidation of Neo-Liberal oligarchy, rather than something which provides genuine escape from the previous regimes of central authority.
But the continued occurrence of democratic backsliding, popular dissatisfaction with contemporary capitalism and globalisation, as well as the presence of overtly illiberal movements suggests
that — unlike what the likes of Fukuyama predict — the Neo-Liberal 'world order' is all but a final step.
History has always come not as the product of a single dichotomy but of a multitude of different back-and-forths between one thing and its other, like an aperiodic tiling formed by millions of
interlinked tug-of-war games, whose arrangement and configuration, functioning, and overlap of groups and actors become so unfathomably complex put together that it would be insane to think we
could ever accurately and reliably predict their output.
We should not assume these systems will eventually come into a lasting state of equilibrium nor 'stabilise' into a single cohesive mode of operation,
because we cannot know if that will ever be the case. To assume we do know such, and that we are confident as to where the roulette wheel will land — how foolish would we look,
having sacrificed all but our lives, which by then will have been fully dedicated to a prediction which turned out to be mistaken.
We should not assume an end of any certain kind — for maintaining this outlook means letting it consolidate itself, warping our perspective so that we expect a specific outcome with certainty.
We come to believe either that a resolution to (his)tory will come from the 'inherent' properties or functions of something — thus we do not need to act to ensure our views our realised, because
it is a prophecy whose fulfilment is inevitable — or we believe that peace will only come in the form of slow, unbearable decay, then suffering, war and death.
One side sabotages ideas by means of overconfidence, and the other by demotivation. This fatalism should be avoided at all times, whether the base thought it comes from is of Fukuyama, Marx or
Spengler — regardless of whether it comes in the form of hyper-optimism or pessimistic nihilism. Ultimately, both incur from the mistaken belief that we can predict the outcome of a nondeterministic problem,
that the outcome of history is fixed no matter what.
